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PERTILIn TIMING •WAGES,AND HUMAN CAPITAL
ABS TRACT
Women who have first births relatively late in life earn higher wages.
This paper offers an explanation of this fact based on a staple life-cycle
model of human capital investment and timing of first birth. The model
yields conditions (that are plausibly satisfied) under which late
childbearers will tend to invest more heavily in human capital than early
childbearera. The empirical analysis finds results consistent with the
higher wages of late cbildbearers arising primarily through greater
measurable human capital investment.
McKinley L. Blackburn
Department of Economics










New York, NY 10027I.Introduction
Between 1970 and 1983, the first birth rate in the U.S. declined by 19
percent. In addition, according to survey data collected by the Census
Bureau, the proportion of childless women increased substantially between
1976 and 1985 in the age groups 25-29, 30-34, and 35-39 (see Table 1). An
extensive body of previous research has established that these trends
reflect both (1) an increased tendency to permanently forego childbearing
and (2) an increasing tendency to delay the initiation of childbearing,
among those women who do ultimately bear children, (see Bloom, 1982, 1984,
and 1987; Bloom and Pebley, 1982; Bloom and Trussell, 1984; O'Connell,
1985; and Rindfuss1 Morgan, and Swicegood, 1988) After many years of
remarkable stability, the female/male wage ratio also began to increase in
the l980s (from 0.60 in 1980 to 0.64 in 1984). There is some evidence that
this latter change is associated with relative increases in human capital
accumulation on the part of women (see Smith and Ward, 1984; O'Neill,
1985)
This paper develops some explicit theoretical linkages concerning the
relationship between a woman's fertility-timing behavior and her human
capital acquisition and wage profile. We develop a simple model in which
women make their human capital investment and fertility timing decisions
conditional on preferences over the timing of their first birth. By
simplifying the nature of the fertility/work decision, we are able to
describe the conditions under which a woman who prefers (and therefore
expects) to be a delayed childbearer will invest more heavily in her human
capital than a woman who prefers to have an early first birth. The model
suggests that these conditions are fairly general: if the discount rate is
greater than the economy-wide growth rate of wages for workers who are not
1Table 1
Percent Childless Women, 1976-85, by Age
1976
Year
1980 1982 1984 1985
Age Group:
18—24 69.0 70.0 72.2 71.4 71.4
25—29 30.8 36.8 38.8 39.9 41.5
30—34 15.6 19.8 22.5 23.5 26.2
35—39 10.5 12.1 14.4 15.4 16.7
40—44 10.2 10.1 11.0 11.1 11.4
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports,
Series P-20, No. 406, Fertility of American Women: June 1985,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1986.human capital investors, then delayers will be more likely to invest in
human capital. Our empirical analysis indicates that data for white women
aged 28-38 in 1982 provide some support for our theoretical model. There
exists a strong positive relationship between several proxies for human
capital investment and the age at which a woman bears her first child.
However, the empirical analysis does not support the proposition that the
usual proxies for human capital represent more investment for women who
choose to delay their childbearing.
II. Stylized Facts
Our empirical analysis uses the National Longitudinal Survey of Young
Women (MLS). This MISsurveyhas been conducted every year (or every other
year in some periods) since 1968, when it started with 5,159 women aged
14-24. The main purpose of this survey has been to gather information on
the labor market experiences of young women. Questions on ages of children
in various years of the survey enabled us to calculate age at first birth.
We have used the NLS data through 1982 to construct a data set with wage,
labor market and fertility timing data for a sample of working women aged
28-38 in 1982. Like many longitudinal data sets1 the NLSYoungWomen's
Cohort has suffered from sample attrition over time; still, the 1982
reinterview includes roughly 70 percent of the original respondents.
The NLS data offer a number of advantages compared to other data sets used
to study the correlates of fertility timing. For one, the longitudinal
structure provides a method of accounting for unobserved heterogeneity.
lore importantly, perhaps, the richness of the MIS data permit us to
construct typically unavailable measures of several key determinants of
earnings. The variables used in this study whose construction relies on
2data from a large section of women's work lives (in many cases their entire
career to date) include actual labor market experience,1 tenure, and
occupational training.
Table 2 reports statistics descriptive of wages, human capital, and
other characteristics of white women2 classified into four groups on the
basis of the age at which they bore their first child: (1) women who had
their first birth before the survey in which they were age 22 (early"
childbearers); (2) women who had their first birth between ages 22 and 26
(inclusive); (3) women who first gave birth after age 26 ("late"
childbearers); and (4) women who had not given birth by the time of the
1982 survey ("childless" women).3 Only individuals with no missing data
for any variables (except the training, occupation, and early wage
variables) are used to compute the statistics reported in Table 2. The
statistics are reported separately for women who were currently employed on
the date surveyed in 1982, and for women who were not employed at that
time; the differences in the reported statistics across age-at--first-birth
1This is preferable to potential experience, usually approximated asage
minus education minus 5, which is known to be a poor indicator of actual
experience for women (see Garvey and Reimers, 1980).
2The sample excludes all nonwhites. Initial investigations suggested that
the estimated effect of age at first birth on wages in wage regressions for
blacks was very different from the estimated effect for whites. Also, the
percentage of blacks who delayed childbearing past the age of 26 was very
small -
3Kanyof the women who are classified as childless in 1982 will eventually
become late childbearers. We would like to separate these women from those
who will remain permanently childless, but are of course unable to do so
with our data.
4The training variable is missing for some individuals, and otherwise
seemed to contribute little independent information. Consequently, we
retained observations for which this variable could not be constructed.
The training and other variables are explained more fully in the footnotes
to Table 2
3Table 2
Wages and Other tharacteristics ofWhite WorkingWomen Aged 28-38, by Age at First Birth








5.75 6.59 8.23 7.93
(.11) (.20) (.32) (.18)
11.96 13.55 15.01 14.66
(.08) (.13) (.21) (.12)
7.007.85 8.09 7.77
(.17) (.25) (.33) (.18)
4.69 5.27 5.50 6.04
(.16) (.27) (.37) (.23)
33.39 33.35 33.06 31.77
(.14) (.20) (.27) (.15)
on-worknvp women
Age at first birth
£22222k22± thij
11.2013.2514.00 12.71
(.12) (.16) (.26) (.50)
2.67 4.06 5.95 4.96
(.19) (.19) (.31) (.51)
33.16 32.46 33.34 32.14











.08 .07 .11 .14
.11 .29 .45 .41
.48 .41 .26 .28
.17 .13 .11 .11
.15 .10 .06 .07
2.90 2.28 1.64
(.07) (.06) (.07)
.03 .03 .06 .07
.05 .21 .32 .15
.29 .46 .40 .31
.25 .17 .12 .22
.31 .12 .10 .14
.07 .01 .00 .11
467 256 115 372 252 192 104 59
1. Standarderrors atteans are reportedinparentheses,Sampleweightswere notused in compoting the estimates.
2.The hourly wageis constructed fri reported rates and time units of pay.
3. Righest grade completed.
4. Athai eerience is constructed from a combination of sample-period and retrospective job history questions.
5.For each yearinthe survey, the respondentindicates whether ornutsheis with the sameIoyer as inthe previoussurvey. This
information is combined with occasional questions on when the respondent began her last job ta construct a ieasure of years with the
current onployer. Tenure is reset tc zero when a woman is not working at the time of the survey.
6. Fur the non-woring women, this is occupation of last job, for those who report an occupation.
1.Firstavailable observation prior to 1982 when nan was daildiess. Mjusted for inflation and productivity to 1982 base usipo
PC! fixed-weight index and index of noni arm besiness productivity.
i. Constructed from survey questions on thiration of occupational and on-the-job training. lbeasured in year-uiva1ents (units of2DDO
hours).




4.35 5.29 5.97 5.72
(.14) (.14) (.21) (.13)
.15 .15 .25 .17
(.02) (.02) (.06) (.02)
3.81 5.03 5,78 4.68
(.19) (.15) (.19) (.22)
.10 .07 .13 .26
(.02) (.02) (.03) (.07)categories tend to be very similar for these two samples. With the
exception of the early wage variable, all values are for 1982.
Table 2 reveals a pattern of increases in the 1982 wage, and in all of
the human capital measures, as age at first birth increases; childless
women tend to have values of these variables that are close to those of the
late childbearers. These are raw means, of course, and therefore do not
control for the influence of some of the variables in the table on others.
For example, a natural explanation for the positive association between
wages and age at first birth is that educational attainment is positively
related to age at first birth.5 Also, the small experience and tenure
differences in Table 2 actually do represent a substantially more intensive
rate of investment in experience- and tenure-related human capital for
delayed childbearers, since their greater investment in education leaves
them with relatively less potential time for accumulating experience and
tenure.6 The training measure does not follow as consistent a pattern as
education, tenure, and experience, but it does reveal a weak tendency to
increase with age at first birth. Finally, later childbearers and
childless women are more likely to be in professional and managerial
occupations than earlier childbearers, who are more likely to be in
administrative, service and blue collar occupations.
The early wage variable reported in Table 2 represents an attempt to
5while it is not noted in Table 2, it is also true that later childbearers
are not delaying simply because they spend more years in school. In fact,
higher education is associated with more delaying net of the extra years
spent in school. This follows from calculations that show that the
difference between age at first birth and the age at completion of
schooling is greater for those women with more education.
6This is clear from the fact that educational attainment increases withage
at first birth, while the average age in each age-at-first-birth category
is roughly the same (except for the childless, for whom it is the lowest).
4measure the hourly rate of pay atwhichwomen begin their labor market
career following the completion of their schooling. In selecting this
variable, we found the earliest wage (in 1968 or later) for each woman in a
year in which she was not in school, and had not previously had her first
birth. We were able to find such a wage for 988 of the 1,817 women in our
sample.7 The differences in the average level of the early wage across
age-at-first-birth categories are similar in pattent to those for the 1982
wage. however, the differences tend to be somewhat larger with the 1982
wage. For example, the average early wage of "late" childbearers is 37
percent higher than the average early wage for "early" childbearers, while
the 1982 wage for late childbearers is 43 percent higher than the 1982 wage
£ or early childbearers, For the childless compared to theearly
childbearers, the difference grows from 31 percent in the early wage to 38
percent in the 1982 wage.8
Some of the relationships revealed in these descriptive statistics
replicate results found in other studies. Previous analyses of the
covariates of age at first birth uniformly reveal that educational
attainment varies positively and strongly with first birth timing and the
likelihood of being childless (Bloom, 1982, 1984; Bloom and Trussell,
1984). A related literature documents and studies the relationship between
teen childbearing and schooling (e.g. ,Furstenberg,1976; Furstenberg, at
al, 1987; Geronimus and Koreninan, 1990; Hofferth, 1984; McCrate, 1989;
Upchurch and McCarthy, 1989). However there is considerably less research
7since this variable is from different years for different women, we make
corrections for differences in the price level and the level of labor
productivity across the years.
8These comparisons are made using the early wage averages for the part of
the sample that was working in 1982.
5on the direct relationship between a woman's wages or earnings and the
timing of her childbearing.9 Bloom (1987) finds that in the younger of two
cohorts analyzed in the June 1985 CPS, there is a positive relationship
between age at first birth and wages, even controlling for schooling, time
out of the labor force, and several other determinants of earnings. While
a great deal has been written about the impact on wages of interruptions in
labor force attachment for childbearing and childrearing, this research has
not focused on the timing of these interruptions per se (Polachek, 1975;
Mincer and Ofek, 1982; Corcoran, et al., 1983; O'Neill, 1985).
One line of research that does explore specific links between wages
and fertility timing is the "business cycle" work of Butz and Ward (1979).
The idea underlying this work is that working women will tend to have
children when real wages are relatively low, as during a recession. This
theory could also have implications for the cross-section relationship
between fertility timing and wages, although there have been few attempts
to test these implications)°
What appears to be lacking in the existing literature is a
model that explains all of the relationships in Table 2 in a reasonably
unified manner. In the next section we offer a theoretical model in which
9To our knowledge, the only prior empirical studies of this subject are
Trussell and Abowd (1980), Bloom (1987), and Lundberg and Plotnick (1989).
Both Lundberg and Plotnick, and Trussell and Abowd, focus on the effects of
teenage childbearing only.
10Macunovich and Lillard (1989) attempt to apply the Butz and Ward model to
micro-data. In contrast to fertility responses to aggregate wage
movements, however, they identify effects of wages on fertility timing from
cross-section wage variation and time-series wage changes in a panel data
set. It seems that a complete test of the Butz and Ward model using
micro-data, however, should distinguish expected from unexpected wage
changes1 and examine the effects of unexpected changes.
6human capital and fertility timing decisions are made jointly. Our model
suggests that women who prefer to delay the initiation of childbearing will
invest more in human capital than women who prefer to begin their
childbearing earlier. After presenting this model, Sections IV and V
explore more fully some of its empirical implications.
III. Theoretical M2lcl
The defining feature of the standard human capital model is that
individuals have the opportunity to invest in training that enhances their
productivity but that is costly to obtain. Workers find it desirable to
obtain training when its benefits -- higherwages after the training is
completed --outweighits costs. In this section, we extend a simple human
capital model to allow childbearing to affect the human-capital investment
decision through the effect that withdrawal from the labor force after
childbearing has on the benefits of the human capital investment. The
key implication of the model is that relatively late childbearing is
associated with greater human capital investment; factors that lead to
relatively late childbearing also lead to greater human capital investment1
and vice versa.
In analyzing the human-capital/fertility-timing decision for women, we
make several simplifying assumptions.11 First, we assume that all women are
equally productive in the labor markec at the start of their working
career. Second, all women bear one, and only one, child. Third, all women
simpler version of our model, due to Edelfson (1980), is presented in
Montgomery and Trusselj. (1986). Happel, Hill, and Low (1984) and Razin
(1984) and Cigno and Ermisch (1989) also present economic models of
fertility timing decisions, but only Cigno and Ermisch have treated human
capital accumulation as determined jointly with fertility timing.
7work from time 0 to time R, except for a period of length r following
childbirth when women leave the work force and have no earnings; women must
choose to have their child at some time between time 0 and time R-r.
Fourth, all women have the option of investing in one type of human capital
which increases a woman' s productivity (and thus her wage), at the rate
s, while she is working; the cost of the human capital investment is C (at
time 0) and is the same for all women. Finally, the only source of income
for a woman is her own earnings.
We also assume that a woman's lifetime utility depends both on the
present value of her lifetime income and on the time period in which she
has her child, i.e. U-U(YT) where Y is the present value of lifetime
income and T is the time period of childbirth women prefer both higher
incomes and earlier periods of childbearing (i.e., we assume 13>0 and
Uc0).Fortractability, we use a linear utility function, U—Y-aT, with
a>0. Women differ in their preferences toward early childbearing, so that
a varies across women.
At the start of her working career, a woman has two choices to make:
one, whether she should invest in human capital; and, two, when she should
have her first child. We seek a description of these two choices in the
following way: first we derive an expression for the optimal age at first
birth conditional on either investment (with optimal age 9)or
non-investment (T*); second, given that the women is optimizing in her
choice of time of childbirth, we ask whether her lifetime utility would be
higher under investment or under non-investment.
The complete details of the solution for these two decisions are quite
cumbersome (due to the possibility of boundary solutions for time of birth)
and therefore are presented in the appendix. Here we highlight the nature
Sof the solution by focusing on the case where all women choose an interior
solution for time of birth (I.e., O<T*a-r). If a woman chooses to invest




wherew is the initial wage, q is the economy-wide rate of growth of wages.
and r is the discount rate. U(Y11T) is maximized with respect to T, for
which the first-order condition for a utility extremum is
P1.81(T) —we(5tT11I)T1 —a . (1)
The left-hand side of (1) represents the marginal benefit from delaying
childbirth, and equals the present value of the wage received prior to
childbirth minus the present value of the wage received when returning to
the labor market after childbirth. The right-hand side of (1) is the
marginal cost of delaying. It follows that the marginal benefit of
delaying will only be positive if q<r, which we assume throughout. The
condition will represent a maximum if si-q-rCO, which we also presently
assume. (If s.+-q-r>O, the optimal time for the birth will be either 0 or
R-r;thiscase is discussed in the appendix).





The condition for a utility extremum is
M5(T) — —a . (2)
9which is also the condition for a maximum when q<r. The left-hand side of
(2) represents the marginal benefit of delaying for a non-investor.
It follows from equations (1) and (2) that a woman who has invested in
human capital will choose to delay her childbearing more than if she had
not invested in human capital. This fact is illustrated in Figure 1, which
graphs the marginal benefit and marginal cost functions for both investors
and non-investors. While the two marginal benefit functions are equal when
T—O, at any time T the slope of the investor's marginal benefit function is
larger (less negative) than the slope of the noninvestor's function. As a
result, T*>T* must hold. As a decreases (as in the fall from a to s in
I I! 0 1
Figure 2), the larger slope of the investor's marginal benefit function
implies that the difference between and T* will increase, as long as Tt
has not reached R-r, the upper boundary for childbearing ages}2
The next step in our analysis of the decision process is the human
capital investment decision. Given that the woman will be optimizing on her
fertility timing once she has chosen whether or not to invest, we can
derive the indirect utilities of the two choices as functions of the
parameters of the problem, i.e.1 VaV.(w,q,r,s,s,C), j—I,M. Then a woman
will choose to invest in human capital if VI>VN. As is demonstrated in the
appendix, the indirect utility from investing grows more quickly as a
declines than does the indirect utility from not investing; this means that
women with less strong preferences for early childbearing are more likely
to find VI>VN to be true than women more desirous of an early birth.
This result is illustrated in Figure 2 for the case where both
also that as s increases, the investor's marginal benefit function
will grow less steep (swinging out to the right but keeping the same










• -Iinvestors and non-investors choose an interior solution for T*. Define the
surplus from delaying childbearing as the total additional benefits
associated with delaying childbearing past T—0 minus the total additional
(utility) costs. For instance, with childbearing preference parameter
the surplus from delaying for noninvestors is S1(a0) —area(ABC)in
Figure 2, and the surplus for investors is S1(a0) —area(ABD).While it is
obvious that S1(a0) > S(a0), a woman with utility parameter a will choose
to invest only if
S(a0) -S(a0)> _(VI_VN)IT*O
i.e. if the additional surplus associated with investing is greater than
minus the difference in indirect utility between investors and
non-investors if both were to have their child at time 0. (VV)IT*O
- 13
does not depend on the value of a (see case 1 of the appendix).
Consider another woman with utility parameter a—a1, where a1Ca0. Her
surplus from delaying will be S(a1)—area(AEF) if she does not invest, and
S1(a1)—area(AEG) if she does. Going from a0 to a1, the change in both
surpluses will be positive, i.e. AS—S (a1)-S(a0)—area(BEGD) and
ASN_SN(al).SN(aO)_area(BEFC) are both greater than zero. But as is clear
from Figure 2, AS1>aS, implying that it is more likely for a woman with
the lower value of a to find investing optimal than for a woman with the
higher value, since the left-hand side of (3) increases as a decreases but
the right-hand side remains unchanged.
What does this imply for the earnings of women who choose to delay
13This differencemay be positive, though in this case all women would end
up choosing to make the human capital investment.
11N
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-4childbearing? As discussed earlier, we expect women with lower values for
a to delay their childbearing more, while we also expect them to be more
likely to invest in human capital)4 With human capital investment
increasing the wages of investors relative to non-investors at all times
after T'-O, we expect to observe delayed childbearers having higher wages
than otherwise similar women (in terms of initial productivity) who choose
to bear their child earlier. It also follows that the difference in the
wages of delayed and early childbearers will grow over time due to the
higher rate of human capital investment among delayed childbearers.
While the model has been discussed in terms of variation in the taste
parameter a being only the difference between women, it is also true that
increases in a, or decreases in C, make it more likely both that women will
delay childbearing and that they will invest in human capital. Futhermore,
slight changes in the model do not alter the basic conclusions. For
example, if the model is changed to reflect the fact that women have more
difficulty continuing their investment in human capital after having their
first child, so that wages grow at the rate q (and not at the rate q+s)
after returning from childbirth even for women who were earlier investing
in human capital, our primary conclusions still hold. Likewise, if there
is depreciation of human capital while a woman is out of the labor force,
delayers will still invest more in human capital, as depreciation merely
increases the difference between the leaving and returning wages and so
"swings out" the M31(T)curve,
Differential investment in human capital is not the only reason why
contrast, Cigno and Ermisch (1989) suggest that higher human capital
accumulation (prior to marriage) should lead to earlier births.
12delayed childbearers might be expected to have higher wages. Suppose there
were no possibility to invest in human capital, and that all women had the
same value for the childbearing utility parameter a. Instead, women differ
in their initial level of productivity (and so their wage) at the time they
enter the labor force, From equation (2) we know that a higher initial wage
will shift upwards the marginal benefit curve, as from MB to MB; in Figure
3. As a result, women with higher initial wages will more often choose to
delay, and so delayed childbearing will be associated with higher wages at
all points in the woman's lifetime, Differences in initial wages may also
be part of the explanation for the fact, discussed in section II, that more
educated women tend to delay their childbearing more after completing their
schooling.
The empirical implications of our model are that women who choose to
delay childbearing will accumulate more education, and, to the extent that
labor market experience and tenure represent human capital investment, will
also accumulate more experience and tenure. This greater investment will
raise the relative earnings of later childbearers. We might expect two
additional findings, because we may not be able to perfectly measure human
capital investment, but rather must regard variables such as education,
experience, tenure, and even our training measure, as proxies. First, we
may find that fertility timing has an effect on wages after controlling for
measurable human capital, though such residual effects could also be due to
unobserved heterogeneity in the initial productivity of workers. Second,
we may find higher returns to education, experience, and tenure, for
delayed childbearers, in wage regressions. We explore these possibilities
in thenextsection.
13IV, agj Equation Estimates Fertility TJ-mjg
It is difficult if not impossible to measure humancapitaldirectly.
As a result, labor economists often interpret wage variation attributable
to observable variables as resulting from differences in investment in
humancapital,relying on a theoretical structure that relates the
observable variables to human capital investment. Onefamousexample is
Mincer's interpretation of labor market experience as representing
investments in on-the-job training (see Mincer, 1974). In the present
context, this approach suggests including age-at-first-birth variables in a
wage regression as potentially reflecting differences in human capital
investment not captured by other human capital prnies that are included in
the regression. In this section, we consider this approach, as well as
more explicit tests of the humancapitalmodel.
Table 3 presents least squares estimates of log wage equations for the
NLS sample of working women considered in Table 2. The wage variable is
the reported hourly wage and salary income usually earned in the
respondent's primary job at the time of the survey. In all of our
regressions, we include as independent variables dummy variables for the
same classification of age at first birth as was used for Table 2; age at
first birth less than 22 is the omitted categoryJ5 In column li, we
report coefficient estimates from a least-squares regression of the natural
logarithm of the wage on these timing dummy variables, as well as dummy
variables for living in the South and living in an SMSA (crude controls for
15ln unreported results, we experimented with linear, quadratic, and other
specifications of age-at-first-birth effects. A linear specification Was
clearlyinadequate, and the dummy variable specification is more readily
interpretable than other non-linear specifications that appeared to fit the
data equally well.
14Table 3
Wage Equation Estiiates for White Working Woien,
Ordinary Least Squares
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithi ofHourlyEarnings)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Aoe at first birth:
22-26 .11 .01 -.03 —.03
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
27* .32 .11 .07 .06
(.05) (.05) (.01) (.04)
Childless .29 .12 .06 .06
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
Jointsign4ficance
(rvalue):t .00 .00 .06 .08
Years of education .06 .07 .06
(.01) (.01) (.01)
Post-college -.06 -.05 -.06







Tenure2x l0 —d3 —.12
(.05) (.05)
.15 .22 .34 .37
Occupation duny variables
included:3 No No Yes
1.There are1210observations. Standard errorsof estliates are reported inparentheses.Controlsincluded
inall specifications include: duny variables fortwo children andthree or lore children; duny variables for
saritalstatus harried, spouse present and divorced, widowed or separated); and duny variables [or residence
in the South and in an SXSA.
2. Couputed [roa standard F-test.
3. The occupation categories in Table 2 are used to define duny variables for occupation.cost-of-living differentials). In addition, we include dummy variables for
whether the woman was married with spouse present, or was instead divorced,
widowed or living apart from her spouse (never married is the omitted
category))6 Since the number of children a woman has given birth to is
correlated with age at first birth (see Table 2), we also include dummy
variables for two children, and for three or more children, as independent
variables. The choice of omitted category for the number of children
classification implies that the childless coefficient measures the
difference between childless women and early childbearers with one child.
As the estimates in Table 3 make clear, substantial wage differentials by
age at first birth persist once these controls are added. Women with age
at first birth between 22 and 26 earn on average 11 percent more than early
childbearers, and these differentials rise to about 30 percent for late
childbearers and childless women.
Because few (if any) controls for human capital investment are
included in the specification in column (I), these estimates of wage
differentials due to age at first birth may reflect differences in the
observable proxies for human capital such as education and experience. In
column (2), we add education to the regression)7 Not surprisingly, the
wage differentials by age at first birth fall considerably. Nonetheless,
sizable and statistically significant differentials remain for late
16Women's marital status has been linked theoretically to differential human
capital investment (Becker, 1985), though Korenman and Neuniark (1990) find
evidence to the contrary.
'7The education variables are years of schooling, and a dummy for
post-college (i.e, more than 16 years of schooling). Specifications
including dummy variables for high school and college degrees were also
estimated, but the coefficient estimates were statistically insignificant
and small.
15childbearers and childless women, consistent with differences in human
capital investment above and beyond education,
Human capital investment may also occur on the job. Following Mincer
(1974), in column (3) we add linear and quadratic terms for experience and
tenure to the regression. The coefficient estimates for experience and
tenure are statistically significant, and of the expected sign and
magnitude. The age-at-first-birth coefficients are further reduced by the
inclusion of experience and tenure, and though individually are
statistically insignificant, remain marginally significant in a joint
F-test. Inclusion of occupational dummy variables -- whichmay reflect
human capital investment differences -- furtherreduces the coefficient for
"late" childbearers, and leaves the three age-at-first-birth dummy
coefficients jointly insignificant (at the .05 level).
The estimates in Table 3 yield two findings. First, differences in
observed proxies for human capital investment (schooling, experience, and
tenure) can explain a sizeable portion of wage differentials associated
with fertility timing. Second, wage differentials remain once account is
taken of these proxies, consistent with there being differences in
unobserved human capital investment (although the statistical evidence on
this point is not strong). We next attempt to determine whether these
remaining fertility-timing effects actually reflect further differences in
human capital investment.
Including dummy variables for fertility timing may be a crude way to
estimate effects of differential human capital investment that remain once
our proxies are included. A better specification may be to let the
coefficients of these proxies vary with age at first birth. These types of
effects could arise if the education of women who intend to delay
16childbearing consists of more human capital investment (thus giving rise to
higher returns to education), or if later childbearers invest more per unit
of labor market experience or tenure, in column (1) of Table 4, we let the
coefficient on the years of schooling variable differ for late childbearers
and childless women by including interactions of education with the 27+ and
childless dummiesJ8 In column (2), we let the linear experience and tenure
coefficients vary by age-at-first-birth category, while in column (3) we
let the returns to all three human capital proxies vary. Focusing on
column (3), we see that the point estimates of the education interactions
are consistent with greater human capital investment for each year of
education for later childbearers. For example, the return to education is
almost 60 percent higher for the the late childbearers (27+) relative to
the <22 category.19 But these differences are not statistically
significant. While the point estimates of the experience interactions are
small and insignificant, the tenure interactions are jointly significant.
The tenure coefficient estimates suggest that late childbearers receive a
higher return to tenure, but also provide the anomalous result that
childless women receive lower returns to tenure (this latter inference
supported by a marginally significant t-statistic). Overall, the patterns
of these interactions do not support the proposition that our human capital
measures represent more human capital investment for women who delay their
childbearing.
18An interaction for the 22-26 category was not included because the
estimates in Table 3 provided no evidence that these women earn higher
wsges than early childbearers once observable human capital proxies are
included in the wage regression.
11n unreported results, we verified that these differences do not simply
reflect nonlinearities in education effects entailing higher returns to the
higher levels of education of later childbearers.
17Table 4
Wage Equation Estilates for White Working Woten,
Interactive Specifications and Incorporating training Measures,
Ordinary Least Squares
(Dependent Variable: Natural Loqaritbi of Hourly Earnin)1
Int.tactiv. 1raininq&pecifjc.tions (1) T2T (4) (5) Afl firet birth:
22—26 —.02 —.01 .O2 —.02 —.03
(.01) (.03) (.03) (.01) 4.01)
274 .04 .07 -04 .07 .07 (.05) (.04) (.05) (.04) 4.04)
Cktildj.s. .06 .06 .07 .06 .06 (.04) (.01) (.04) (.04) (-04) Joint signtlcance
(p—value): .30 .05 .16 .09 .10
Years of education .05 .05 .05 .06 .06 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
Poet-oolleqe —.06 -.06 -.05 -.04 -.04 luyvariabi. 4.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.01)
flperienoe .04 .04 .04 .04 .04
(.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) 4.01)
rkparJence2 I 10 —.10 —.10 —.10 —.1] —.13
(.07) 4.07) 4.07) 4.07) (.07)
Tenure .04 .04 .04 .04 .05 (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01) (.01)
TenureaS so .13 —.11 —.11 .12 —.13
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.06)
Training .05
(.03)












Jointainfic.nc. (p—value): .s .52





Joint•inff1cance p—value): .06 .04
.37 .37 .37 .37 .37
N 1210 1210 1133 1133
1. Standard errors of estimates are reported in parentheses. Controls included in all specifications include:
duny variables for two children and three or tore children; duny variables for marital status (married, spouse
present and divorced, widowed or separated); duny variables for residence in the South and in an SNSA; and
occupation dusty variables.
2. Computed trot standard F-test,As a final attempt to better capture human capital differences, we
utilize the training measure presented in Table 2 as a more direct measure
of human capital investment. In column (4) of Table 4 we repeat the
estimation of the specification in column (4) of Table 3 using the smaller
sample with nonmissing training. Then, in column (5), we add to this
specification the training measure, The estimates suggest that each
additional year of training leads to a 5 percent increase in wages.
However, inclusion of training does not affect the fertility timing
coefficient estimates, orthecoefficient estimates for experience and
20
tenure.
Our next step in the empirical work is to explore whether these
conclusions are affected by the failure to control for two other potential
influences on the relationship between wages and fertility timing: the
direct effect of wages on fertility timing; and the effect of fertility
timing on labor force participation.
The idea that wages may directly affect fertility timing was
illustrated in the discussion of Figure 3 in Section III. This discussion
suggested that fixed omitted variables in a wage equation (e.g. ,ability,
aggressiveness, and "spunk"), which would tend to increase starting wages,
21
should also lead to delayed childbearing. To examine this possibility, we
200ne interpretation of these results is that much of the human capital
investment undertaken by delayed childbearers does not occur in the formal
settings captured by the training variable.
21The presence of fixed effects in the wage equation error is a plausible
explanation for why there may be a correlation between the wage equation
error and the age-at-first-birth variables, leading to biased coefficient
estimates. However, since current wages should have little direct effect
on past childbearing behavior, a correlation between the curnnt wage and
the age-at-first-birth variables is unlikely to arise from a correlation
between age at first birth and the current-period innovation in the wage
equation error.
18include as a regressor the residual from a regression of the early (log)
wage on characteristics of women at the time of the early wage observation;
this residual should control for any fixed effects in the wage equation
error term.22 In columns (2), (5), and (7) of Table 5, we re-estimate three
specifications from Tables 3 and 4, using the smaller sample for which the
early wage variable was available. In columns (3), (6), and (8) we add the
early wage residual to each of the specifications.23 The results suggest
that there is some persistence in wages over time; the coefficient on the
early wage residual (which is measured, on average, 11 years prior to 1982)
ranges from .27 to .30. The coefficient estimates for the fertility timing
dummy variables fall when the early wage residual is included, although the
decline in the coefficients is small relative to the standard errors of the
coefficient estimates. The implication is that heterogeneity in initial
wages does not affect to any great extent the measured relationships
between wages and fertility timing. In columns (1) and (4) we report
coefficient estimates for the age-at-first-birth dummies when they are
included as regressors in the early wage equations.24 These estimates also
do not reveal a strong correlation between starting wages and the timing of
(later) fertility once the effects of human capital on wages are removed.
cannot calculate a standard fixed-effects estimator because the
age-at-first-birth dummy variables are fixed over time.
23The early wage residuals differ by specification. In column (3), the
early wage residual is from a regression that does not included experience
and tenure (since the 1982 regression does not include these variables).
while in columns (6) and (8) the early wage regressions do include
experience and tenure. However, the early wage regressions for column (8)
do not include the age-at-first-birth interactions with education.
24The age-at-first-birth dummies were not included in the early wage
regressions used to generate the early wage residuals in columns (3), (6),
and (8).
19Table 5
Wage Equation EstilatesforWhite Working Women,
Incorporating Early Wage Eesidual,
Ordinary Least Squares
(Dependent Variable: Katural Loqarith. of Bourly Earnin)1
5Z 1952 1,12 len (1) (2) (2) (4) (5) (4) (1) (I) atf ir•t birth:
22-26 .04 .01-.01 .00 -.05 —.04 -.04 .04 (.04) (.04) (.05) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.06) (.05)
274 .04 .14 .S1 .00 .04 .06 .03 .03 (.05) (.07)(.06)(.04)4.06)(.04)(.07) t.07)
C2Sldlna .07 .15 .11 .03 .04 .05 .09 .04 1.04)(.06)(.06)(.04) (.06)(.06)(.06) (.04) Joint aiqnficaac.
(p-value)! .35 .01 .04 .72 .04 .06 .07 .13 .72
Early caqerni6iaal ... .50 .-. - -. .27 .-. .77
(.03) (.06) (.05)
IdeS firat b1rt, reducation:
27* .. - . . . . . . .. . ... . .. .031 .035
(.0231 (.0731
chIidla.a .- - .016 .015
(.017) (.036)
Joint alqnific.nca (rv.1u.):7 .. ... ... ... .. - .39 .50
Aqe at lint birtb..x psoerienot:
774 . .. ... . .. ...... ... .010 .006
4.014) (.0141
C5i1dl.aa .,. ...... . . - ... ... .004 .011
(.010) (.011)
Joint aiqnfioano.
(p-value) --- --.... ... ... ... .69
Aqpatfirst birth r t.nur-e:
77+ ... .. . .. . . .. . .. . . - .001 —.001
(.012)(.012)
-.. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . — .021 —- 022
4.009) (.009)
Jointaiqnf1cance (p—value), ... .05 .04 ... .. . .. . .02 .01
.32 .20 .25 .47 .32 .35 .33 .36
Sxperi.noeand tenure
(linear and squared) and
occupation duny varlablea Included: Ito lie 14o Yea tea teaIn Ye.
1. There are 6% obsenations. Standard errors of estimates are reported in parentheses. Controls included
in all specifications include: dummy variables for two children and three or lore children; duny variables for
marital status (married, spouse present and divorced, widowed or separated); and dummy variables for residence
in the South and in an SKSA. In columns (I) and (4)dummyvariables for the year from which the early wage
observation were drawn are included.
2. Computed from standard f-test.Since the estimates in Tables 3 through 5 are based on samples of
women that exclude those women not working in 1982, inferences from these
estimates may suffer from sample selection bias (see Heckman, 1979). The
nature of our sample definition implies that our estimates are conditional
on women working, and so may not correspond to the population of all women.
In particular, it seems plausible that the age-at-first-birth coefficients
may be affected by our sample selection, since from Table 2 there are clear
differences in the proportion of women working across age-at-first-birth
categories.(This proportion varies from 53 percent among the late
childbearers to 86 percent among the childless.) This difference may be
due to reservation wages varying systematically by womens' age at first
birth, so that late childbearers have higher reservation wages, and
childless women lower reservation wages, than earlier childbearers.25 If
so, then we would expect equations estimated with the complete population
(i.e., not conditional on working in 1982) to exhibit larger differences in
wages between early childbearers and the childless, and smaller differences
between the early childbearers and the later childbearers, than we observed
in earlier tables.
To study the influence of selectivity on our wage equation estimates,
we re-estimated specification (2) in Table 3 -- whereeducation, but not
experience and tenure are included --usinga maximum-likelihood procedure
for the two-equation model suggested in Heckman (1979)26 In column (1) of
25Reservationswages would follow this pattern if the presence of children
(and especially young children) raised the opportunity cost of market time
for women.
26Experience and tenure were not included in thewage equation or the probit
equation for working in our selection-corrected estimations. Tenure could
not be included, since it is zero if and only if the woman is not working,
while past labor market experience is very likely to be correlated with
20Table 6, we present estimates from a model where several variablesare
included as determinants of working status (husbands income and
unemployment, alimony and child support, and several family background
variables) but are assumed not to belong in the wage equation
specification. Compared to Table 3, these results suggest that --
consistentwith our expectations -- the27+ effect was overstated in our
earlier estimations, while the childless effect was understated; but the
change in the coefficients due to the selection correction is not very
large. Since it is also possible to correct for selectivity without
imposing the restriction that the additional variables (mentioned above) be
excluded from the wage equation we re-estimated our selection model
without imposing these restrictions.27 These alternative estimates are
presented in column (2). In contrast to the previous results, with this
specification the 27+ coefficient estimate increases while the childless
coefficient drops, relative to the least-squares estimates, and the changes
are larger than observed in column (1). However, there are two reasons to
prefer column (1) and the conclusion that selectivity is not important to
the relationships we observe between wages and fertility timing: one, the
likelihood-ratio statistic (x2—14, with 13 degrees of freedom) for testing
the exclusion restrictions in column (1) is not significant; and, two, the
positive sign of the error correlation in column (1) is more plausible.28
the error term in the probit equation for currently working.
271n this specification, identification comes from the nonlinearity
associated with the assumption of bivariate normality for the error terms.
28The negative correlation coefficient found in specification (2)suggests
that low-wage women are more likely to be working than high-wage women, all
else the same. Given that exogenous income variables are included in the
probit equation, this seems unlikely.
21Table 6
WageEquation Estijates for White Working Woaen,
Selectivity Corrected, Naxiti Likelihood
(Dependent Variable: Natural Logarithi of liourly Earnings)1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ane at first birth:
22-26 -.01 .04 -.01 .06
(.03) (.04) (.03) (.01)
27+ .11 .19 .09 .18
(.05) (.05) (.05) (.05)
Childless .14 .08 .14 .09






p .29 —.52 .29 —.52
(.16) (.12) (.16) (.11)
Log-likelihood —1556.1 —1549.1 -1555,5 -1548.3
Exclusionrestrictions
iaposed on wage equation: Yes ho Yes No
1.Standard errors of estiiates are reported in parentheses. Controls included in wage and employment equations
include: duny variables for two children and three or more children; duny variables for marital status
ciarried, spouse present and divorced, widowed or separated); dummy variables for residence in the South and
in an 5)15K; years of education; and a dummy variable for post-college education. In columns (2) and (4 the
following family backound variables are included in both equations husband's income and weeks husband spent
unemployed (both set to zero for unmarried women); the sum of income fro. alimony and child support (set to zero
for never married women); father's education; mother's education; naber of siblings; a dummy variable equal
to one if the respondent's mother worked when respondent was age ii; a dummy variable equal to• one if the
respondent lived with both a father and a mother at age 14; and dummy variables corresponding to each of these
variables, equal to one when the variable was missing (in which case the variables were set equal to zero).
In columns (1) and (3) these variables were excluded from the wage equation.Column (3), however, shows that the education interactions are reduced
when selection corrections (with exclusion restrictions) are made,
v.flRelationshipBetween Human çpjtal anFertilityTiming
The results in the previous section indicate that wages are higher for
delayed childbearers because they have greater accumulation of observable
proxies for human capital. As mentioned, this is consistent with our model
of joint human capital and fertility timing decisions, In this section, we
explore the alternative possibility that the correlation between human
capital and fertility timing is spurious, in the sense that human capital
and timing appear to be related because both are primarily determined by
29 the family background of the woman.
We would like to be able to disentangle the structural relationship
between timing and human capital, but the exclusion restrictions necessary
to identify such a model appear to be so arbitrary that an interpretation
of the results as valid structural estimates would be highly dubious.
Instead, we focus on the equilthrium" relationship between fertility
timing and human capital. In particular, we consider whether the positive
relationships between age at first birth and the human capital variables in
Table 2 are to any extent due to unobserved heterogeneity associated with
family background. We estimate regressions of education, experience, and
tenure on the same set of age-at-first-birth dummy variables used earlier.
We then add an extensive set of family background variables available in
the NLS.30 We do not assert that these variables capture all sources of
29Lundberg and Plotnick (1989), McCrate (1989), and Ceronimus and Korenman
(1990) have considered this possibility for education.
30Ceronimus and Korenjuan (1990) take this a step further by looking at
22unobserved heterogeneity. Indeed, if we find that the inclusion of these
variables partially reduces the association between fertility timing and
human capital, we would have to allow for the possibility that a more
complete set of variables could explain the entire relationship. However,
if we find no diminution in fertility timing effects once we control for
background, it seems more reasonable to conclude that heterogeneity does
not underlie the results.
The first two columns of Table 7 report results with education as the
dependent variable. In column (1) the background variables are excluded,
while in column (2) they are included. When these variables are added, the
coefficients of the fertility timing dummy variables decline by 20 to 25
percent. Thus, we cannot decisively reject the view that the
education/fertility-timing differentials reflect unobserved heterogeneity
rather than human capital investment choices.
In columns (3) and (4) we estimate regressions with experience as the
dependent variable, and with education included as an independent variable.
The equation is identified by assuming that the errors of the education and
experience equations are uncorrelated.31 in the equation for experience in
column (4), we also add the early wage residual, to allow for the
possibility that delayed childbearers accumulate more experience because
they start off with (and possibly continue to have) higher wages. The
differences in schooling completion, conditional on whether or not a teen
birth occurred, for a sample of siblings. By looking at within-family
differences, they may be able to control more thoroughly for differences in
family background and other sources of heterogeneity.
31
With this restriction, our two-equation model follows the classical
recursive-system form. Qualitatively similar results were found using
reduced-form experience equations, although the changes in the coefficient
estimates when the age-at-first-birth variables are added are more
difficult to interpret in this case.
23Table 7
Years ofEducation, Experience, and Tenure Regressions for White Working Woten,
Ordinary Least Wares'
Years of Education Exoerience
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Aoe at first birth:
22-26 1.60 1.27 1.06 1.01 .49 .39
(.16) (.15) (.39) (.39) (.57) (.57)
27+ 3,03 2.27 2.02 2.09 1.05 .94
(.22) (.20) (.44) (.44) (.64) (.64)
Childless 2.79 2.20 2.06 2.03 1.71 1.58
(.14) (.14) (.37) (.37) (.53) (.53)
Years of education .., - .70 —.72 -.21 -.20
(.05) (.05) (.07) (.08)
Earlywage .79 ... 1.01
(.33) (.47)
V .27 .39 .37 .39 .10 .12
N 1210 1210 698 698 698 698
Fullybackground
variablesincluded:2 No Yes No Yes No Yes
1. Standard errors of estitates are reported inparentheses. Single—year age duny variablesare includedin
allregressions.
2. Fatily background variables include: father's education; •otber's education; nutber of siblings; a duny
variable equal to one if the respondent's mother worked when respondent was age 14: a dummy variable equal td
one if the respondent lived with both a father and a tether at age 14; and dummy variables corresponding to each
of these variables, equal to one when the variable was missing fin which case the variables were set equal to
zero).addition of the early wage residual and the family background variables
leaves the estimated age-at-first-birth effects on experience unaltered.
In columns (5)and(6) we use tenure rather than experience as the
dependent variable; with tenure, inclusion of family background and the
early wage residual reduces the 27+ and childless coefficient estimates by
10 percent or less.
We are therefore quite comfortable concluding that heterogeneity
related to family background does not explain the estimated experience and
tenure differences associated with fertility timing. Our theoretical model
of the relationship between fertility timing and human capital investment
offers an explanation of these differences. It may also partially explain
the correlation between education and fertility timing, although our
results suggest that this empirical relationship is at least partly due to
heterogeneity associated with family background characteristics.
V.Summary andConclusions
This paper has developed a model of a woman's optimal human capital
investment behavior over the life cycle conditional on her preferences over
the timing of her first birth. In the context of this model we show that
late childbearers will tend to invest mare heavily in human capital than
early childbearers. Our model also suggests that women with higher initial
wages will choose to delay their childbearing more. Our empirical analysis
explores the validity of these theoretical linkages between fertility
timing and the wages that women earn while in their late 20's and 30's.
Fertility timing is strongly associated with differences in wages, as well
as differences in education, experience and tenure, The wage differences
are largely explained by difference in these latter variables, which appear
24to be quite good proxies for human capital. We find that the differences
in the human capital proxies with respect to age at first birth can be only
partly attributed to underlying heterogeneity. Thus, the human capital
differences seem to explain an important component of the overall
relationship between labor market outcomes and fertility timing.
We wish to emphasize that our results are consistent with the human
capital hypothesis, but cannot be said decisively to confirm this
hypothesis. In fact, what may be a stronger test of our theory -- thatthe
usual human capital proxies represent greater investment for delayers -- is
givenlittle support by the evidence. Still, our model does provide a
unified explanation of the relationships we observe between human capital
and fertility timing. We take it as a challenge for future research to
develop and test alternative, encompassing models that also explain these
empirical relationships.
25APPENDIX:
An Age-at.First-Birth/lncome Model with Endogenous Fertility Timing
Notation:
—presentvalue of lifetime income for a woman who invests in human
capital
Y —presentvalue of lifetime income for a woman who does not invest in
human capital
w —wagereceived at beginning of work career
T —pointin time at which woman bears her first (and only) child
r length of period spent out of the labor force after childbirth
R —timeof retirement
s —growthrate of (real) wages due to investment in human capital
q —growthrate in wages due to general wage growth
r —discountrate
Assumptions:
(i) all women are identical (in terms of productivity-related
characteristics) ac the start of their working career;
(ii) all women work from time 0 to time R, except for the period of
length r following childbirth.r is the same for all women; in
particular it does not depend on T.
(iii) all women have identical discount rates;
(iv) all women have the option of investing in one type of human capital
by paying C (at time 0) and receiving a higher growth rate of their
wage over time, with the difference in the growth rate of wages
between investors and non-investors equaling s,
(v) a woman's lifetime utility depends only on the present value of her
lifetime income and the age at which she has her first child, i,e.
U—U(Y,T), with ÔU/8Y>O and 9U/3TcO. In particular, we assume IJ—Y-aT,
with a>0.
A. Fertility Timing Decisions
(1) Optimal timing for human capital investors
From text equation (1), we know that the first order condition for a
utility extreaun conditional on a woman investing in human capital is:
ME(T) -(s+q-r)T[1(q-r)TJ a .(Al)
Note that if q<r, the optimal timing is always T*O. For there to be an
interior solution for T*, it is necessary that (Al) represent the
conditions for a maximum and not a minimum, This will be the case if
263MB1(T)/BT —w(s+q)e+T[1(r)Tj<
i.e.if s+qcr. If s+q>r, then either T*O or T*R-r.





log if 1 >
a
> I(s+q-r) [1(q-r)rj 1(q-r)r]
—R-c if (s+qr)(R-r) ￿
Thecondition for T*0 is that MB(O)￿a; the condition for T*4tristhat
MB(R-r)aNote that 8T*/Ba￿Oi.e.,the lower the preference for early
childbearing the longer the delay before first birth.
If s+q>r, then the woman chooses to delay until R-r as long as







The upper boundary for T* will hold for lower values of a.ENotice that
e(5_r17) -1
wher a_w[1.e(1aT] the woman is indifferent between
(s+q-r) (R-r)
choosingT*_O orT*Rr, since the utility of both choices is equal.]
(2)Optimaltiming for non-investors
The first-ordercondition for a utility extremuxu (text equation (2)) is
—a (A.2)
Thesecond-order condition for a maxjuj is satisfied if:
27<




1 r a a
T* — log1 if I >
N (ci -r)




As with T* 3T*/3as0.Thecondition for T*O is the same as for T*—O
(assuming s+qcr); however, T*Rr is less likely than Tt_R-r. The
expression for the difference in optimal fertility times between
investors and non-investors (assuming an interior solution for both) is:
-s a
T*T* — log > C I N (q-r)r (s+q-r)(q-r) w[l-e I
so that investors will wait longer until their first birth. In addition,
Tt_R.r is more likely than T*Rr. which also supports the idea that
investors are more likely to delay. It also follows that o(Tt-T)/aa<O. so
that changes in timing preferences have a larger effect on investors'
timing decisions than on non-investors'.
B. Hwnan Capital Investment Decision
Given that boundary solutions to the age at first birth decision are
possible, it is necessary that we analyze the investment decision under
several cases (corresponding to whether or not an investor or non-investor
would be at one or the other boundary). There are five separate cases that
are exhaustive of the possibilities. (Again, throughout this section we
will assume that q.cr).Under each case, we derive the following: one, the
conditions under which the case holds; and two, an expression for the
difference in the indirect utilities V—V(w,q,r,a,s,C), j—I,N
,between
investors and non-investors. The discussion assumes that the only
characteristic that varies across women is the value for a in the utility
function.
28Case (1): T1—O ; T—O
Conditions:(A) if s+qcr, then this case holds if
a











WIeret)nl - IN(s-+-q-r)L J(q-r)[ j
Thedifference in utilities does not depend on a, but lower values of a
make this case less likely





Note that (e'-l)/x >1as long as x>O (the proof follows from L'HOpitals
Rule and the fact that d{(eX1)/x]/d,o.Q when 00), so that this case is
possible if s-s-q>r.








It follows that 3(V-V)/Ba<O.
Case (3): O.CT'-r
Conditions:
This is the case where neither investors nor non-investors would be at





Difference in Indirect Utilities:
-Sr (s+q-r)r (q-r)r we ae w ae


















Case(4): Tt_R-r ; OCrR-r
This can happen under one of two sets of conditions:





30The difference in indirect utilities is:
v -v — (s+q-r)(R-r)1-
W





Again, lower values for a will be associated with a greater likelihood of
investment in human capital, since:
(V -v)i 1 a
— log -(R-r)C0. 8a (q-r)











- IN(s+q-r)L J(q-r)[ J
Conditional on this case holding, the likelihood of investing does not
depend on a.
Combining cases where appropriate, it follows that there will exist a
single value for aa* such that women with a>a* will choose nor to invest
in human capital while those women with asa* will choose to invest. The
Appendix table summarizes how the difference in indirett utilities is
affected by changes in a. The value for a such that V-V—O will be 8*;
withlower values of a making higher-numbered cases more likely, it follows
that as a is decreasing below a*, V-V must be nonnegative and
nondecreasing, while as a increases and is greater than a*, must be
nonpositive and nonincreasing) Lower values of a will thus be associated
with more delaying and greater investment in human capitaL
1
For this reasoning to hold, itisalso necessary that V-V not experience
discrete downward jumps when moving from one case to another. Continuity
of V-V rules out any such discrete downward jumps. If s+qCr we know
31Appendix Table
Effect of Change in Utility Parameter a on Differences
in Indirect Utility
Case s-*q<r s+q>r
(1) 8(V-v )/ôa —0 IN 8(V -v )/âa — IN
0
(2) - - 8(V -V )/öa C0 IN
(3) 3(V-v )/ôa C 0 IN --
(4) 8(V-v )/8a C0 IN 8(V -v )/Ba IN
< 0
(5) 3(V-v )/aa —0 I N 3(V -v )/Ba I N
— 0
V -V is a continuous function of a since T* and T* are continuous
IN I N
functions of a and V and V are continuous functions of T* and T*. if
I N I N
s+q>r, T* is no ]onger a continuous function of a; but since the indirect
utility of T*_0 and T*_Rr is the same at the point where the investor




Becker, Gary S.1985. "human Capital, Effort, and the Sexual Division of
Labor.t1 Journal 21 Labor Economics 3: 533-558.
Bloom, David F. 1982. "What's Happening to the Age at First Birth in the
United States? A Study of Recent Cohorts." Demograhv 19: 351-370.
______1984."Delayed Childbearing in the United States." Pooulation
Research Policy Review 3: 103-139.
_______1987."Fertility Timing, Labor Supply Disruptions, and the Wage
Profiles of American Women." 12.& Proceeding 21 SIi 5ecifi. Statistics
Section of th American Statistical Association. 49-63.
_______andAnne R. Febley. 1982, "Voluntary Childlessness: A Review of
the Evidence and Implications." Population Research Policy Review 1:
203- 224.
_______andJames Trussell. 1984.1'What Are the Determinants of Delayed
Childbearing and Permanent Childlessness in the United States?"
Demo&raphy 21: 591-611.
Butz, William P. and Michael P. Ward. 1979. 'The Emergence of
Countercyclical U.S. Fertility." &nerican Economic Review 69; 318-28.
Cigno, Aleasandro and John Ermisch. 1989."A Microeconomic Analysis of
the Timing of Births." rooean Economic Review, 33: 737-760.
Corcoran, Mary, Greg J. Duncan, and Michael Ponza. 1983. "A Longitudinal
Analysis of White Women's Wages." Journal 21 human Resources XViII:
497- 520.
Edlefsen, L.1980. "The Opportunity Costs of Time and the Numbers
Timing, and Spacing of Births." Mimeograph.
Furstenberg, Frank. 1976. Unplanned Parenthoc (New York: Free Press).
Furstenberg, Frank, Jeanne Brooks-Cunn, and S. Philip Morgan. 1987.
Molescent Mothers ft Later Lt (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press).
Geronimus, Arline T. and Sanders Rorenman. 1990. "The Socioeconomic
Consequences of Teen Childbearing Reconsidered." Mimeograph.
Carvey, Nancy and Cordelia Reiiners. 1980. "Predicted vs. Potential Work
Experience and Earnings Function for Young Women." In Ronald Ehrenberg,
Ed., Research in Lsbr Economics.
Rappel, SK., J.K. 11111, and S.A. Low. 1984."'An Economic Analysis of the
Timing of Childbirth." Popiiation Studies 38: 299-311.
Heckman, James J. 1979. "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error."
Econotnetrica. 47: 153-161.Hofferth, Sandra L.1984. "Long-Term Economic Consequences for Women of
Delayed Childbearing and Reduced Family Size." Qemogranhy 21: 141-156.
Korenman, Sanders and David Neumark. 1990. 'Marriage, Motherhood, and
Wages." Mimeograph.
Lundberg, Shelly and Robert D. Plotnick. 1989. "Teenage Childbearing and
Adult Wages." Mimeograph.
Macunovich, Diane J. and Lee A. Lillard. 1989. "Income and Substitution
Effects in the First Birth Interval in the U. 5., 1967-1984."
Mimeograph.
McCrate, Elaine. 1989. "Returns to Education and Teenage Childbearing."
Mimeograph.
Mincer, Jacob. 1974. Schoplin. Experience and Earnjpgj (New York:
National Bureau of Economic Research).
Mincer, Jacob and Solomon Polachek. 1974. "Family Investments in Human
Capital: Earnings of Women." In T.W. Schultz, ed., fl£conQmicsaL.thg
Family(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press).
Montgomery, Mark and James Trussell. 1986. "Models of Marital Status and
Childbearing." In Handbook g.fLaborEconomics. Edited by Orley
Ashenfelter and Richard Layard. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
O'Connell, Martin. 1985. "Measures of Delayed Childbearing from the
Current Population Survey1 1971-1983." Unpublished paper presented at
the 1985 annual meetings of the Population Association of America.
O'Neill, June. 1985. "The Trend in the Male-Female Wage Cap in the United
States." Journal .fLaborEconomics 3: S91-S116.
Polachek, Solomon W.1975. "Differences in Expected Post-School
Investment as a Determinant of Market Wage Differentials."
International Economic Review 16: 451-469.
Razin, Assaf. 1980. "Number, Spacing and Quality of Children: A
Microeconomic Viewpoint." In Research in Population Economics, Volume
2, pp. 279-293.
Rindfuss, Ronald 5., S. Philip Morgan, and Cray Swicegood. 1988. First
Births j1 America. (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press).
Smith, James P. and Michael P. Ward. 1984. "Women's Wages and Work in the
Twentieth Century." Rand Report No. R-31l9-NICHD.
Trussell, James, and John Abowd. 1980. "Teenage Mothers, Labor Force
Participation, and Wage Rates." Canadian Studies iii PoDulation 7: 33-48.
Upchurch, Dawn M. and James McCarthy. 1989."The Effects of the Timing of
a First Birth on High School Completion." Mimeograph.U.S. Bureau of the Census.1986.Fertility of American Women: June 1985
Current Population Reports. Series P20 No. 406, U.S. Goverment
Printing Office, Washington, D.C.